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THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO RETAIN CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE 
Lorna Richardson* 
 
The right to retain contractual performance which is otherwise due, when faced with 
a breach by the other party to the contract (sometimes referred to as “mutuality 
retention”),1 is of significant practical importance. When A is sued by B, A will not 
wish to perform his contractual obligations unless B has performed hers. The right to 
retain is well established in Scots law but there are a number of difficulties with the 
current law.2  
This is the first piece of scholarly work to consider the right of retention in a holistic 
fashion, considering all of the controls on the right to retain cumulatively. It is hoped 
that in doing so a better understanding of retention and, as a result, how it ought to 
develop in future will be achieved. The Scottish Law Commission recently decided 
not to recommend legislative reforms, instead leaving it to the courts to clarify and 
develop the law.3  This article may provide a springboard for such judicial 
development.  
 
A. What is the Right to Retain Performance? 
The right to retain in civilian systems is derived from the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus (the defence of the unperformed contract).4 There are traces of such a 
rule in Scots law from the thirteenth century. 5 The right to retain is based on the 
principle of mutuality in contract. Erskine stated, 
 
No party in a mutual contract, where the obligations of the parties are the 
causes of one another, can demand performance from the other, if he 
                                                                    
*Lecturer, University of Edinburgh. This article is dedicated to the memory of Prof Joe Thomson, a 
truly inspiring teacher, without whom I would not be where I am today. With thanks to Professor 
Laura Macgregor for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper and the anonymous reviewer for their 
comments. Any errors are my responsibility.  
1 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot Law Com 
Discussion Paper No 163, 2017), chapter 2.  
2 This can be seen in the most recent Inner House case on retention, JW&H Lamont of Heathfield 
Farm v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33. For further discussion of the problems with that case see L 
Richardson, “What do we know about retention now?” 2018 ELR 387.  
3 Scottish Law Commission Report on Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of Contract and 
Penalties (Scot Law Com Report No 252, 2018), para 11.32. 
4 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd ed (2007), para 20.44. A detailed account of the 
history of retention and lien is provided in AJM Stevens, Pledge and Lien, 2008, chapter 10. See also 
the discussion of the history of the exceptio in the South African case of BK Tooling (Pty) Ltd v Scope 
Precision Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 391 (A).  
5 Marioun Lady Somervale, July 10, 1492, ADC 1.246; and the discussion in McBryde ibid; WW 
McBryde, “Remedies for Breach of Contract”, 1996 ELR 43, p 64.  
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himself either cannot or will not perform the counterpart, for the mutual 
obligations are considered as conditional.6 
 
The essence of the right to retain is that a party to a contract (A) need not perform 
his obligations under the contract if his contracting partner (B) will not perform her 
contractual obligations.  
 
It is clear that retention operates as a self-help remedy: A can retain his performance 
during the period in which B has failed to perform her obligations. In this way A’s 
retention exerts pressure on B to perform. When B performs A must also perform; 
the right to retain lasts only as long as there is a breach of contract by one’s 
contracting partner. While some doubt has recently been cast on the matter7 
retention also operates as a defence to an action: A can plead retention should B 
raise proceedings against him seeking implement of his obligations, or damages for 
his breach of contract. Retention permits a party to retain performance where 
failure to perform would otherwise amount to a contractual breach. 
 
Retention is a temporary remedy. It does not resolve the dispute between the 
parties. A may retain and, as a result, B performs. As noted above A would then have 
to perform. As such retention can be brought to an end by a contracting partner’s 
performance. Where retention is used as a defence it may result in performance, the 
payment of damages or compensation:8 A may sue B for performance, B would have 
a right to retain until A performed his obligations or paid damages in lieu thereof. A 
may do so and B would therefore have to perform her obligations. Retention may be 
followed by compensation: A sues B for payment or damages for breach of contract, 
B claims retention due to A’s breach, and counterclaims for damages as a result of 
that breach. The court will determine the respective claims; and where monetary 
sums are due to and by each of the parties the sums will be set against each other in 
extinction of the obligations, with the party owing the higher amount paying over 
the balance to the other.  
 
While retention is clearly a useful remedy and is often pled when a party is sued for 
breach of contract9 the scope of its use and the way in which it ought to be 
controlled have caused significant difficulty. Despite this, no scholarly work has, to 
date, considered the controls on the right to retain in a comprehensive fashion. This 
article does so.  Case law has suggested how each of the different controls on the 
right to retain should operate but no cases have considered all controls together or 
considered their interaction with each other. Taking a more holistic approach is                                                                     
6 Erskine’s Institute IV.iii.86. 
7 As discussed at p 12 below. 
8 This is the Scottish term for setting liquid claims against each other. It is similar to legal set-off in 
English law.  
9 Recent examples include Burnside v Promontaria (Chestnut) Ltd [2017] CSOH 157 and Lamont v 
Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33.  
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important: if one control is set at a relatively low level that might suggest that 
another should be set at a higher level to ensure that the right to retain is kept 
within appropriate limits and is not used abusively. Without taking such an 
approach, and recognising the interplay between controls, the discussions on the 
limits of the right to retain are incomplete and can result in one control developing 
in a particular way, where in fact, another control can better deal with the perceived 
problem. It is hoped that by drawing attention to this courts in the future will bear in 
mind all of the controls on the right to retain to allow this important practical 
remedy to be developed in a coherent manner.  
 
 
B Current Controls on the Right to Retain 
 
Having set out how the right to retain operates, this part considers current controls 
on the use of the right and the problems with those controls. Each of the controls 
will be considered in turn, before going on to consider the interaction between 
them.  
At this stage it should be noted that retention does not appear to require any 
proportionality between A’s breach and the performance retained by B.10 For 
instance, A may sue B for the price due to A of £25,000. Suppose that B has suffered 
loss due to a breach by A of the contract in terms of which the price is due. B may 
retain her obligation to pay £25,000 until her damages claim has been determined. 
B’s quantification of her claim may be £5,000, with that being the sum sued for, not 
the sum found due by the court. Nonetheless, B would be able to retain £25,000 
until £5,000 had been found due to her in damages. At that stage both claims would 
be liquid and could be set against each other in compensation, with the result that B 
would have to pay to A the excess £20,000. The need to control retention from 
abuse is an issue that has arisen in the case law11 and is a concern of solicitors.12 
 
 
(1)  Control One: The Obligations Must be Counterparts of Each Other 
 
It is clear that for B to retain performance of her obligations they must be 
counterparts of the obligations which A has breached. There is an assumption that 
all of the obligations in a contract are the counterparts of the other. In Inveresk v 
Tullis Russell Lord Hope noted, 
 
                                                                    
10 HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, 4th ed, (2016), para 5.21.  
11 For instance in Graham v Gordon  (1843) 5 D 1207; Earl of Galloway v M’Connell 1911 SC 846; and 
Stobbs & Sons v Hislop 1948 SC 216. See more recently Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308; Inveresk plc v 
Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd 2010 SC (UKSC) 106; McNeill v Aberdeen City Council 2014 SC 335; 
Lamont v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33.  
12 Scottish Law Commission Report on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot Law Com Report No 174, 
1999) para 7.16. In the Report on Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of Contract and 
Penalties (n3), a majority of consultees were of the opinion that the courts should have the power to 
deal with abuse of retention, para 11.27.  
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The guiding principle is that the unity of the overall transaction should be 
respected. The analysis should start from the position that all of the 
obligations that it embraces are to be regarded as counterparts of each other 
unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.13 
 
The indication to the contrary can be in the wording of the contract or the way in 
which the contract is structured. For instance, where a contract is structured in 
phases, as is common with large-scale construction projects, the right of retention 
will likely operate only within each phase rather than across the contract as a whole. 
As such B would not be able to withhold payment in relation to phase two due to 
breaches of contract by A in phase one.14 A further example may be where a 
framework agreement is entered into between parties setting out how they will 
conduct business with each other but which does not, of itself, impose obligations 
on either of the parties. Obligations will only arise where an order is placed by one of 
the parties. In such a case B may not be able to withhold payment for order ten due 
to a breach by A in fulfilling order seven. 
 
The parties’ obligations need not be within the same contract for retention to 
operate. The important thing is that the unity of the transaction is respected. A 
transaction might be structured using a number of different contracts. Where that 
occurs it would allow B to retain her obligation under contract 1 where A was in 
breach of his obligation in contract 2. There does however have to be a connection 
between the contracts: they must be part of an overall transaction. This was the 
situation in Inveresk.15 Inveresk raised an action seeking payment of additional 
consideration due under an asset purchase agreement in terms of which Inveresk 
had sold various assets to Tullis. The parties had also entered into another contract, 
a services agreement, in terms of which Inveresk were to provide certain services to 
Tullis, including the manufacture, sale and distribution of specified products for a 
certain period of time. The agreements were related. They had been entered into on 
the same date and the entire agreement clauses in each contract referred to the 
other contract. The services agreement was to ensure continuity in manufacture and 
distribution of certain products pending their full integration into Tullis’s business 
following the asset purchase. The question for the court was whether Tullis could 
retain performance of their obligation to pay the additional consideration under the 
asset purchase agreement pending the outcome of a separate action which Tullis 
had raised against Inveresk for alleged breaches of the services agreement. The 
court found that Tullis were entitled to retain. 
 
The discussion above indicates that this control of the right to retain sets a low 
threshold in assuming that all obligations in one transaction are the counterparts of 
the other. There have, however, been recent comments from the Inner House which                                                                     
13 2010 SC (UKSC) 106 at para 42.  
14 Bank of East Asia v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213; although such a position conflicts with the 
decision in Turnbull v M’Lean (1874) 1 R 730, as noted in Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at para 11. 
Further doubt was cast on this aspect of Bank of East Asia by Lord Drummond Young in Lamont v 
Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33 at para 37. However in the same case Lord Malcolm used this aspect of 
Bank of East Asia with approval, para 53.  
15 2010 SC (UKSC) 106.  
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suggest a narrower approach to this issue, which would make it more difficult for 
obligations to be counterparts of each other, and as such would narrow the scope of 
the right to retain.  In McNeill v Aberdeen City Council16 Lord Drummond Young17 
stated that the right to retain was the ability to withhold substantive obligations 
under the contract when faced with a breach by the other party. He went on to 
explain that substantive obligations are 
 
fundamental obligations that define what a contract is intended to achieve; 
in a contract for sale of goods these would be the supply of the goods and 
the payment of the price, and in a contract of employment they are the 
performance of services by the employee and the provision of salary or 
wages by the employer.18 
 
This then suggests that only a breach of a main or primary obligation under a 
contract would trigger the right to retain a counterpart main or primary obligation. 
Based on this analysis there seems to be no right to retain in respect of ancillary 
obligations under a contract. Such an analysis is problematic for a number of 
reasons.19 Firstly, it is unsupported by recent Supreme Court authority. As noted 
above, in Inveresk the court held that the starting position was that all obligations in 
a transaction were to be considered the counterparts of each other.20 Incidentally, 
Lord Drummond Young’s comments ten years’ earlier when sitting as a judge in the 
Outer House contradict his more recent deliberations. In 2004 he stated, 
 
the principle of mutuality should not be interpreted in such a way that 
substantially curtails the availability of retention. That applies in particular to 
the requirement that the obligations should be counterparts of each other; 
that requirement should not be used in an artificial manner which breaks up 
the unity of a contract.21 
 
In the same case he went on to note that there is “a presumption that the whole of 
the obligations on one side of a contract are the counterparts of the whole of the 
obligations on the other.”22 
 
Secondly, it may be difficult to determine what the substantive obligations of a 
contract are.  The sale example given in McNeill is fairly simple. Others are less 
obvious. The finding by the court in McNeill that the implied term of mutual trust                                                                     
16 2014 SC 335. He makes the same comments in Lamont v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33 at para 30.  
17 With whom Lords Eassie and McGhie agreed in relation to his analysis of contract law. 
18 2014 SC 335 at para 27.  
19 Although there is a basis for the position; Stair I, 10, 16 sets out examples of obligations that are 
mutual causes of each other; for instance in sale, the obligation to deliver the ware and to pay the 
price, and continues, “otherwise the obligements are not the proper causes each of other…the one is 
but the occasion and motive, and not the proper cause of the other.” See also the comments of Lord 
Neaves in Turnbull v M’Lean (1874) 1 R 730 at  739: “It is a general principle that all the material 
stipulations in a contract forming an unum quid are mutual causes”. 
20 See the passage quoted at p 4 above. 
21 Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at para 9.  
22 Ibid at para 10.  
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and confidence in an employment contract is not a substantive obligation has been 
questioned.23 The position will be complicated in a complex commercial contract 
where there may be a great many obligations on each side, some of which may be 
obviously substantive, others clearly ancillary but many that may not clearly fit one 
category or the other. This problem has been recognised by the judiciary, with Lord 
Marnoch commenting that, “anything other than the simplest contract could 
endlessly be broken down and the law reduced to uncertainty, impracticality and 
obscurity.”24 This is a particular concern given retention can operate as a self-help 
remedy. Where a self-help remedy is available it should be clear when that remedy 
is available.25 
 
Finally, where there is a breach of a substantive obligation this is more likely to be a 
material breach of contract, entitling the other party to rescind. Retention is a useful 
remedy where there is a breach that is not so serious as to permit rescission. By 
narrowing the availability of retention to substantive obligations only much of its 
utility may be eroded. The court in McNeill in seeking to control the right to retain to 
ensure that contractual obligations are performed, missed the important role that a 
readily available right to retain can have: it may force A to perform his contractual 
obligations since if he does not do so he knows that B will be able to retain 
performance of her obligations.  
 
For these reasons it is suggested that Scots law should not develop in the direction 
foreshadowed by the Inner House in McNeill but find other, more suitable ways to 
control the right of retention.  
 
 
(2) Control 2: The Breach must be Material 
 
For retention to be available to B, A’s breach of his counterpart obligation must be 
material. McBryde notes that the Scottish authorities refer to material breach 
usually in the same sense as is required for rescission of contract.26 It is therefore 
necessary to consider what is meant by material breach justifying rescission. It is 
only where a breach is material that the party faced with the breach can elect to 
rescind.27 A material breach has been described in various ways: as a serious or 
                                                                    
23 JM Thomson, “An Unsuitable Case for Suspension?” 1999, ELR 394; and D Cabrelli, “The Mutuality 
of Obligations Doctrine and Termination of the Employment Contract: McNeill v Aberdeen City Council 
(No 2)” 2014, ELR 259. It is difficult to reconcile the finding that the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence is not a substantive obligation when breach of the duty of good faith in a partnership 
contract by A was held to entitle B to withhold performance of its obligation in Forster v Ferguson & 
Forster, Macfie & Alexander 2010 SLT 867.  
24 Forster, ibid, at para 28.  
25 Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach, 2017 (n1), para 2.14. 
26 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 20.60.  
27 Scots law does not classify contractual terms into conditions, breach of which would give rise to the 
right to terminate; warranties, breach of which gives rise to a remedy in damages only; and 
innominate terms, breach of which would give rise to the right to terminate where the consequences 
of the breach are sufficiently serious.  
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substantial breach; as a breach going to the root of the contract; or a breach going to 
the essence of the contract.28 In a famous passage Lord President Dunedin noted, 
  
It is familiar law, and quite settled by decision, that in any contract which 
contains multifarious stipulations there are some which go to the root of the 
contract that a breach of those stipulations entitles the party pleading the 
breach to declare that the contract is at an end. There are others which do 
not go to the root of the contract, and which would give rise, if broken, to an 
action of damages.29 
 
In determining whether or not a breach is material one must consider the nature of 
the breach. The consequences of the breach are not determinative, although they 
may illustrate materiality.30 The matter is a question of fact, determined by 
considering the circumstances at contract formation, and subsequently.31 It can be 
difficult to decide whether a breach is material unless the parties have expressly 
provided for this in their contract.32 Given the question of whether a breach is 
material is so fact dependent other cases in which a breach has been held to be 
material are likely to be of little assistance.  
 
There is however, more recent authority which indicates that the level of materiality 
required for the right to retain is not as high as that needed for rescission.33 It is 
suggested that this authority is to be preferred. Retention is not as drastic as 
rescission; it does not bring performance of all future obligations under the contract 
to an end. As noted above, retention is an interim remedy; suspending performance 
of obligations until counter obligations are performed or damages paid in lieu of 
such performance. As such, it is misplaced in the context of retention to require 
material breach to the same degree of materiality as is required for rescission.  
 
This however creates further difficulties. The first is a terminological difficulty: it is 
confusing to talk of material breach and mean different things depending on 
context. The second, and more pressing, issue is that if the breach need not be so 
material as to justify rescission, how material does it have to be? To this Scots law 
has no answer. The problem may best be illustrated diagrammatically: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     
28 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 20.91 and the authorities cited there.  
29 Wade v Waldon 1909 SC 571 at 576.  
30 McBryde, Contract (n4), paras 20.93-20.94.  
31 Ibid para 20.96.  
32 Although the ultimatum procedure may be used by the party alleging breach of contract where 
there is doubt as to the materiality of the breach or where the breach is not material. Using the 
ultimatum procedure can provide clarity that the breach is a material breach.  
33 Inveresk 2010 SC (UKSC) 106  per Lord Hope at para 43; and EDI Central Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd 
2011 SLT 75, per Lord Glennie at para 111. 
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Trivial Breach  Non-trivial, non-    Material breach 
material breach      
 
No remedy  Remedies available eg   Remedies 
   damages but not     including  
rescission     rescission  
 
 
What is unclear is where between the arrows the breach is sufficiently material for 
retention to be available.34 Should the breach fall just short of being a material 
breach in the sense used for rescission or would a breach just a little more serious 
than a non-material breach suffice? Even where a standard of materiality is 
determined as the applicable threshold, it may, as with rescission,35 be difficult to 
determine when a breach has reached that threshold.36  
 
That this is so with a self-help remedy where non-lawyers may have to decide, 
without the benefit of legal advice, and possibly within short timescales whether 
they can withhold their performance indicates that there are problems. It leads one 
to question what the materiality control is seeking to do and whether this could be 
achieved in another way, using an alternative control. The materiality requirement is 
seeking to ensure that B can withhold all of her counterpart obligations only when 
faced with a sufficiently serious breach of contract by A. It is thought that the fact 
that there need be no proportionality between the obligation breached by A and the 
performance withheld by B is the major difficulty here. In this respect Scots law 
differs from most other European systems, which have a proportionality or 
reasonableness requirement, often based on the obligation to exercise remedies in 
good faith.37 The problem with a lack of proportionality in Scots law is particularly 
acute given the wide availability of retention due to the low threshold of the first 
control: the obligations being counterparts.  
 
There are further reasons to doubt the continued use of the materiality control. It 
seems that the Scottish courts took a wrong turn in beginning to consider materiality 
as a requirement of retention. As noted above, the right to retain in civilian systems 
is derived from the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. In those systems there is 
generally no need for the breach to be material, or indeed, of any standard to trigger 
                                                                    
34 MacQueen and Thomson note that the exact nature of the difference between the two levels of 
materiality has not been much explored, (n10), para 5.12.  
35 See the discussion on p 7 above.  
36 See the difficulty in doing so in Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at para 10.  
37 The commentary to Art III-3:401 of the DCFR in C von Bar, E Clive and H Schulte-Nölke, Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Full 
Edition (2009), p848. A good faith control of retention in Scotland was not supported by consultees to 
the Scottish Law Commission’s 1999 Report on Remedies (n12), para 7.18. Good faith was not 
considered as a control by the Commission in the Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach, 2017 
(n1), instead the SLC mentioned the equitable control of the court.  
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the right to retain.38 This is reflected in the rule found in Art III-3:401 of the DCFR. 
The institutional writers did not refer to materiality.39  
 
Materiality of breach entered Scots law through the acquisition of unilateral 
rescission of contract from English law by the Scottish courts. 40 It appears that the 
linking of materiality to mutuality and thus to retention occurred in Turnbull v 
M’Lean41 in which Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff stated, 
 
I understand the law of Scotland, in regard to mutual contracts, to be quite 
clear – 1st, that the stipulations on either side are the counterparts and the 
consideration given for each other; 2nd, that a failure to perform any material 
or substantial part of the contract on the part of one will prevent him from 
suing the other for performance; and 3rd, that where one party has refused or 
failed to perform his part of the contract in any material respect the other is 
entitled either to insist for implement, claiming damages for the breach, or to 
rescind the contract altogether, except so far as it has been performed.42 
 
As can be seen, in the second comment made in the passage quoted above the Lord 
Justice-Clerk links materiality with mutuality. However, it must be noted that the 
main question at issue in Turnbull was whether M’Lean was able to rescind the 
contract for non-payment of sums found to be due by Turnbull.  
 
McBryde draws attention to the fact that in another case in the same year, Davie v 
Stark,43 Lord Justice-Clerk Moncrieff seems to have realised that materiality was only 
required for rescission44 when his Lordship noted, 
 
The other party is entitled either to refuse implement until the stipulations in 
his favour have been fulfilled, or, provided that the latter are material and 
essential, to rescind the contract altogether.45  
 
However, given other comments made in the case, such as Lord Justice-Clerk 
Moncrieff’s statement that he entirely  
 
                                                                    
38 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 20.60. However, in French law the breach needs to be “sufficiently 
serious” to allow retention: CC Art 1219. See the discussion of this provision in T Genicon, “The 
Exception d’Inexécution” in J Cartwright and S Whittaker (eds), The Code Napoléon Rewritten, (2017), 
p298.  
39 See for eg Erskine’s Institute IV.iii.86, quoted on p 1 above; and Stair’s Institutions I.10.16.  
40 McBryde, Contract (n4) para 20.88; D Johnstone, “Breach of Contract” in K Reid and R Zimmermann 
(eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, Vol 2, (2000), p183.  
41 (1874) 1 R 730. Although it may have been foreshadowed by Lord Cowan’s comments in Barclay v 
Anderston Foundry Co (1856) 18 D 1190 at 1197 where he stated that a gross or unreasonable 
disregard of an obligation would result in the party in such breach being unable to insist on 
contractual performance by his contractual partner. 
42 Ibid at 738, emphasis added. 
43 (1876) 3 R 1114.  
44 WW McBryde, “The Scots law of breach of contract: A mixed system in operation” 2002 ELR 5, p 13.  
45 Davie v Stark, (n43) at 1119.  
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“adhered to the views expressed in Turnbull, that failure to perform any 
material part of a mutual contract by one of the parties will prevent him from 
insisting on implement against the other”46 
 
this is unclear.47  
 
Notwithstanding the perhaps rocky foundation for materiality in the context of 
retention it has taken hold; Turnbull was approved by the House of Lords in Bank of 
East Asia v Scottish Enterprise 48 with Lord Jauncey49 referring to a material breach. 
Further, in Inveresk Lord Hope commented that the materiality requirement seemed 
to be a useful protection against abuse of the right to retain, provided it was 
understood that the level of materiality required is not that which is required for 
rescission.50 
 
A further reason to doubt the materiality requirement is that special lien,51 where B 
need not return A’s corporeal moveable property to A until A has paid B for the work 
carried out on or in relation to the goods, is an example of retention based on the 
principle of mutuality in contract.52 Yet there is no need for A’s breach to be material 
before B can utilise her special lien.53 It is therefore anomalous to require a material 
breach before retention is available.  
 
Finally, it has been argued, it is suggested correctly, that retention should be 
permitted provided the breach is more than trivial given that if a non-material 
breach by A allows him to seek full performance by B “the law may well have 
departed from the common expectation”.54 
 
 
(3)  Control 3: The Court has Equitable Control of the Right 
 
The right to retain is a legal right but it is not absolute; the court can refuse to permit 
a party to retain where it considers that it would be inequitable to do so.55 This 
control mechanism has not featured significantly in cases over the last century56 but 
it has come to the fore in some recent cases. In Inveresk Lord Hope noted that the 
right of retention is not an absolute right and that the court has the power to                                                                     
46 Ibid.  
47 As McBryde concedes in Contract (n4), para 20.59.  
48 Bank of East Asia 1997 SLT 1213. 
49 With whom the other members of the bench agreed.  
50 Inveresk 2010 SC (UKSC) 106 at para 43.  
51 In terms of which B has possession of A’s goods in order to do some work to or on them, eg a 
cobbler with possession of shoes.  
52 Steven, Pledge (n4), para 16.01.  
53 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 2.61.  
54 McBryde, “Remedies for Breach” (n5), p 65.  
55 WM Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd ed, (1929), p627 and the authorities cited there; HL MacQueen 
and J Thomson, Contract (n10), para 5.21.  
56 It is discussed in cases regarding retention of rent by tenants, for instance Earl of Galloway v 
M’Connell 1911 SC 846; and Stobbs & Sons v Hislop 1948 SC 216. It was also mentioned in British 
Motor Body Co Ltd v Thomas Shaw (Dundee) Ltd (1914) SC 922, a case on the supply of goods.  
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prevent its abuse.57 In both McNeill and JH&W Lamont of Heathfield Farm v 
Chattisham58 Lord Drummond Young identified the court’s equitable control as an 
important feature of the remedy. He noted, 
 
In view of the potential range of such a remedy, it seems to me to be 
imperative that the court should be able to ensure that it does not become 
an instrument of abuse. That can readily be achieved by equitable control; in 
any particular case the court may exercise a discretion as to whether 
retention should be permitted to operate, and if so on what terms.59 
 
The authorities suggest that the court can refuse to allow a party to retain his 
contractual performance. It is important to note that the party faced with a breach 
has a right to retain but use of the right can be curtailed by the court in the exercise 
of its discretion.60  
 
What is less clear is when the court will find that it should exercise its discretion and, 
further, how it will exercise that discretion; the equitable control of the court being 
recently described as “undeveloped”.61 As to the former, it has been suggested that 
where B pleads retention simply as an excuse to delay performing her obligation to A 
then the court should refuse to permit retention.62 It has recently been suggested 
that where B claims a breach of contract by A, and seeks damages, in defence to an 
action by A for performance under the same contract such a claim had to be looked 
at critically by the court to determine whether it is fair and just that it should be 
allowed.63 This seems to turn the test on its head. Mutuality retention is available as 
of right unless and until the court determines that it is being used inequitably.64 The 
court should therefore start from the position that B is able to retain, provided she 
has sufficiently specific averments regarding the breach and loss, unless there are 
circumstances which demonstrate that it would be inequitable to allow B to do so.65   
 
As to how the court will exercise control, in some cases66 reference has been made 
to the fact that the court may order that B consigns67 the sum sued for by A to court.                                                                     
57 Inveresk 2010 SC (UKSC) 106 at para 34.  
58 [2018] CSIH 33.  
59 McNeill 2014 SC 335 at para 30.   
60 In this way retention, on the basis of mutuality of contract, is different from the other form of 
retention in the law of obligations, special retention. Special retention is not available as of right. It 
can only be used where the court is satisfied that circumstances exist which mean it should exercise 
its discretion to allow a party to retain their performance. For further discussion see L Richardson, 
“Examining ‘Equitable’ Retention” 2016, ELR 18.  
61 Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach, 2017 (n1), para 2.32.  
62 Gloag, Contract, (n55), p627; Earl of Galloway v M’Connell 1911 SC 846. 
63 Lamont v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33 per Lord Drummond Young at para 44. 
64 Determining whether it is just and equitable to permit A’s damages claim to delay B’s liquid claim is 
part of the law referred to as special retention, not mutuality retention; see L Richardson “Examining 
Equitable Retention” (n60).  
65 This is the case with specific implement, where the court starts from the position that the remedy is 
available unless, in the exercise of its discretion the court considers it should not be granted: see 
Grahame v Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R (HL) 91 and the discussion on p21-22.  
66 Inveresk 2010 SC (UKSC) 106 per Lord Hope at para 34; Earl of Galloway v M’Connell 1911 SC 846. 
67 The party must lodge the sum with the court.  
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Where that occurs B is not retaining performance, as such, but is not giving the 
benefit of his performance to A, until the dispute before the court has been 
resolved. Beyond this, there is no clear guidance as to how the right to retain may be 
controlled by the court.  
 
The issue has however been discussed in obiter comments by the Inner House.  In 
McNeill68 the court opined that if a breach of the obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence by the employee permitted the employer to withhold its obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence (which the court had found it was not able to do, such 
an obligation not being substantive) this would have permitted the employer to 
behave in a manner that wholly disregarded the employee’s interests. This could 
have led to manifest unfairness, allowing the employer to behave in a wholly 
outrageous manner. Retention should not, said the court, be able to achieve such a 
result and, had retention otherwise been available, the court would have found its 
use inequitable. McNeill demonstrates that there may be particular types of 
contracts and / or contractual terms where the court may wish to control the right to 
retain.69  
 
In the recent case of JH&W Lamont two members of the Inner House opined that the 
availability of diligence on the dependence was a factor suggesting that it would be 
inequitable to allow the defender to retain performance.70 Why this should be the 
case is unclear. Firstly, retention is a defence and defenders are unable to seek 
diligence on the dependence. Secondly, even where the defender counterclaims, 
and thus would be able to seek diligence on the dependence, many creditors raising 
an action have the possibility of seeking diligence on the dependence.71 Why should 
the availability of diligence on the dependence prevent the defender from exercising 
his right to retain his performance? It is suggested that it should not.  
 
A further, and significant, restriction on the right to retain was suggested in McNeill 
where the court considered the fact that retention was to secure future 
performance only as an important feature of the equitable control of the right.72 
Lord Drummond Young stated that retention was 
                                                                    
68 For discussion of the case see Cabrelli, “The Mutuality of Obligations Doctrine and Termination pf 
the Employment Contract: McNeill v Aberdeen City Council (No 2)” (n23).   
69 The obligation of mutual trust and confidence in employment contracts has created problems for 
the courts regarding the right to retain: see also Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 1999 SC 
628 and criticism of the case by Thomson, “An Unsuitable Case for Suspension?” (n23).  
70 Lord President Carloway at para 24 and Lord Drummond Young at para 46.  
71 The actions where diligence on the dependence can be sought include all claims for payment of a 
sum – see s15A(2) of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 and s9A(2) of the Debt Arrangement and 
Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002.  
72 McNeill 2014 SC 335 at para 30. Lord President Carloway in Lamont v Chattisham Ltd [2018] CSIH 33 
also considered that the right to retain only operated to secure future performance.  
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a right to withhold performance of substantive obligations under the contract 
pending performance by the other party of its obligations. The right does not 
go further than that.73  
He also stated “the principle of retention cannot generally be invoked in respect of a 
breach of contract that has occurred in the past and is unlikely to be repeated.”74  
It is argued that retention is not so limited. Indeed, Lord Drummond Young appears 
to accept that in the recent case of JH&W Lamont.75 While the reason B retains 
performance, in many cases, will be to try to force A to carry out his reciprocal 
obligation, retention can and should also ensure that B will not have to perform her 
contractual obligations unless and until A performs his reciprocal obligations or pays 
damages in lieu of performance.76 In this way retention is also a defence to an action 
raised by A.77 As noted above,78 security for future performance is only one facet of 
retention, the other being as a defence to a claim for performance or damages for 
breach of contract.79  
There is no conceptual reason for retention to be limited so that it protects only 
those parties who may still be able to obtain performance or wish to obtain useful 
performance from their contracting partners. There is no sound basis on which A 
should be able to obtain decree requiring B to perform her contractual obligations 
simply because the performance of A’s obligations is no longer possible or desirable. 
On the analysis set out in McNeill, A could obtain the benefit of performance under 
the contract from B in such circumstances, leaving B to seek damages from A despite 
the fact that B was retaining performance in the face of a breach of a counterpart 
obligation by A. In Forster v Ferguson & Forster, Macfie & Alexander80 the court held 
that the mutuality doctrine, rather than retention, could be used by B to defend a 
claim by A in such circumstances. Mutuality would prevent A from seeking 
performance by B due to A’s breach. However, this may produce injustice between 
the parties. Suppose A defectively performs his obligations under the contract, for 
example by delivering defective goods to B. As a result B has suffered a loss. Should 
A be prevented by mutuality from seeking performance, i.e. any payment from B? 
Suppose that B’s loss is significantly less than the contract price for the goods.                                                                     
73 McNeill 2014 SC 335 at para 28. Although see the comment at para 30 that, if the right of retention 
is invoked for a purpose other than security for future performance, "it may well be appropriate to 
hold that its exercise is inequitable" (emphasis added). 
74 Ibid, para 29. Similar comments were made by Lord Caplan in Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic 
Co Ltd 1999 SC 628.  
75 [2018] CSIH 33 at para 35.  
76 Gloag, Contract (n55), p 623, 626-627. 
77 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 20.48. McBryde suggests this is the limit of the mutuality principle and 
it does not mean that a party in breach cannot sue at all under the contract, despite authority which 
suggests this: see the discussion at para 20.48-20.52; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract (n10) para 
5.23; WM Gloag and JM Irvine Law of Rights in Security: Heritable and Moveable Including Cautionary 
Obligations (W Green, Edinburgh, 1897), p 306.   
78 See p 2.  
79 In this latter respect retention performs a function similar to equitable set-off in English law.  
80 2010 SLT 867.  
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Preventing A from making a claim for payment on the basis of mutuality, gives B a 
windfall benefit. Allowing retention to operate such that B can retain the price until 
A pays damages for B’s loss would produce justice between the parties.81 
There are a number of authorities,82 including Inveresk83 where a defender has been 
held entitled to retain his performance despite the fact that his contracting partner 
was no longer able to perform his obligations; such that retention was not being 
used to secure future performance. In Inveresk Tullis were held to have legitimately 
exercised the right to retain when retaining their performance would not prompt 
performance by Inveresk of their obligations under the services contract. The period 
for performing those obligations had passed and Tullis were simply seeking damages 
for breach of the services contract.  
It is suggested that the court’s comments in McNeill were an attempt to confine and 
control the operation of retention. There was a clear concern that retention should 
not be used in an abusive fashion.84 While there is a need for such a broad and 
flexible right to have limits placed on its use it is argued that seeking to restrict 
retention to security for future performance only is not the correct way to do so. As 
such retention being used other than to secure future performance should not result 
in a finding that it is being used inequitably.  
 
(4) Control 4: The Claims Must be Contemporaneous  
There is a control which is often overlooked. This is an uncontroversial issue,85 which 
relates to the timing of performance. Party B is only able to withhold her contractual 
performance if A has breached a contractual obligation before the date on which B 
would have to perform her obligation under the contract.86 If on date X, B is due to 
pay A £y and if A has not breached the contract or, it may be added, B is not aware 
                                                                    
81 See McBryde, Contract (n4), para 20.48-20.52; and MacQueen and Thomson, Contract (n10), para 
6.57-6.58. 
82 See Taylor v Forbes (1830) 9 S 113; MacBride v Hamilton and Son (1875) 2 R 775; Gibson and 
Stewart v Brown and Co (1876) 3 R 328; Sharp v Rettie (1884) 11 R 745; British Motor Body Co Ltd v 
Thomas Shaw (Dundee) Ltd (1914) SC 922.  
83 2010 SC (UKSC) 106, the facts of which are discussed at p 4 above. Lord President Carloway in 
Lamont v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33 at para 19 states that Inveresk was a specific exception to the 
rule that an illiquid claim should not delay payment of a liquid claim, because it was concerned with 
the payment of a sum of money against a claim of damages. Yet Inveresk was decided on the basis of 
a right to retain due to the mutuality principle. That principle applies to all contractual obligations, 
not simply payment. Indeed, Lord Drummond Young in Lamont at para 35 opines that there is no 
difference between an obligation to pay money and other contractual obligations, such as delivering 
goods or performing services.  
84 See the comments in McNeill 2014 SC 335 at para 30. 
85 Although Lord Malcolm seems to conflate this issue with whether the obligations are reciprocal in 
Lamont v Chattisham [2018] CSIH 33 at para 54; see L Richardson, “What do we know about retention 
now?” (n2).  
86 Gloag and Irvine note this as the reason for the decision in Fisher v Geddes (1829) 7 S 704: see Law 
of Rights in Security (n77), p314. This is the rule under the DCFR: Art III-3:401(1).  
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of the breach, until after X,87 B is not able to withhold her obligation to pay £y to A.88 
The issue is determined at the date on which performance is due, not the date at 
which proceedings are raised seeking implement of an obligation.  
As such, as well as obligations having to be counterparts of each other (control 1), 
the obligations must also be exigible or prestable89 at the same time for retention to 
be available. 
  
(5) Control 5: The Contract Must be Ongoing 
A further suggested control, raised in some recent cases,90 is that retention is not 
available where the contract has come to an end.91 It is not clear why A should not 
be able to retain performance which was due prior to rescission, in the face of an 
earlier breach by B of her obligations. Rescission brings parties’ future obligations 
under a contract to an end. It does not have retrospective effect. Other remedies 
available at common law for antecedent breaches, such as damages, survive 
rescission. It may be that this control is related to that discussed at B(3), that 
retention is only available as security for future performance, although the courts 
have not made any link explicit.  
 
C. How the Law Should Develop 
The above analysis sets out the current state of Scots law on the ability to retain 
contractual performance. There are a number of problems and uncertainties with 
the law as it stands. As the Scottish Law Commission has not recommended 
legislative reform of the right to retain92 this part sets out how the law may be 
developed by the courts in the future.   
 
(1) Focus on the Equitable Control 
It is argued here that developing the court’s equitable control (control three), and 
using it in conjunction with the requirement that the obligations must be 
counterparts (control one) and the claims having to be contemporaneous (control 
four), while removing the need for materiality (control two) is the best way forward.                                                                     
87 If B is not aware of the breach prior to X he will have no foundation for a claim of retention when A 
seeks payment on X. 
88 Such were the circumstances in Redpath Dorman Long Ltd v Cummins Engine Co Ltd 1981 SC 370, 
which was held as being correctly decided by the House of Lords in Bank of East Asia 1997 SLT 1213. 
89 See Lord Jauncey’s comments in Bank of East Asia at 1217-1218.  
90 Forster v Ferguson & Forster, Macfie & Alexander 2010 SLT 867; Lord President Carloway’s 
comments in Lamont v Chattisham Ltd [2018] CSIH 33.  
91 Although it seems that mutuality may continue to operate this is not retention: Forster v Ferguson 
& Forster, Macfie & Alexander, ibid. See the discussion on p13.   
92 Report on Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of Contract and Penalties (n3), para 
11.32.  
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If the equitable control is developed and the ways in which it will operate are more 
fully understood then there is no difficulty in continuing to adhere to a permissive 
control one; that all obligations in a transaction are assumed to be counterparts 
unless the wording of the contract suggests otherwise. In addition, there would be 
no difficulty in providing that a breach of contract, provided it is not trivial, should 
permit the right to retain (control two).93 Any attempts at abuse can be regulated via 
the court’s discretion. Removing the need for materiality and providing another form 
of control accords with the wishes of the legal community.94 
As discussed above it appears that a major difficulty with the right to retain is that B 
can suspend performance of all of her contemporaneous counterpart obligations 
when faced with a sufficiently material breach by A. There is no need for the 
performance withheld to be in any way proportionate to the effect of A’s breach. 
Focussing on the third control of the right to retain; the equitable control of the 
court, would deal with this problem head on. It would allow the right to be regulated 
in a more nuanced fashion than using controls one and two. Controls one and two 
either allow the right to retain or not: the obligations are counterparts or not; the 
breach is sufficiently material or it is not. The choice is binary and leaves little room 
for flexibility. Control three permits flexibility; there may be situations where it is 
appropriate that B be able to withhold performance of some, but not all of her 
contractual obligations given the effect of A’s failure to comply with his 
obligations.95 The main benefit of control three is its flexibility and the fact that in 
exercising it the court can take account of the circumstances of the particular case. 
However, this benefit can also be considered a problem; certainty is important and 
arguably all the more so given retention can be used as a self-help remedy. Yet, the 
basis on which the court will exercise its discretion to refuse or otherwise control the 
right of retention can be established. Thus parties could conduct their affairs 
applying the particular facts of their case against a framework of factors influencing 
the court’s discretion.    
 
In addition, using the equitable control would prevent some problems with retention 
in certain cases. Retention in the context of employment contracts has caused 
difficulties.96 Commentators have doubted whether it is correct to hold that the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence is not a substantive obligation in an 
employment contract as determined in McNeill.97 It appears that the court came to 
this conclusion in order to limit the right to retain because of the consequences if an 
                                                                    
93 This possibility was considered by the Scottish Law Commission in its Discussion Paper on 
Remedies, 2017 (n1), para 2.34. However, the Commission made no reform proposals on this basis in 
its Report on Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of Contract and Penalties (n3) para 
11.32.  
94 Consultees to the Scottish Law Commission’s Discussion Paper on Remedies had a mixed response 
on whether the breach should have to be material, but the majority of consultees agreed that the 
courts should have the power to deal with abusive or oppressive use of retention: see Report on 
Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of Contract and Penalties, 2018, ibid, para 11.27.  
95 A right of partial retention is not unknown to Scots law: see the discussion at p 20 below. 
96 See Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd 1999 SC 628; and McNeill 2014 SC 335.  
97 See the discussion in part B(1).  
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employer or employee was able to retain performance of that obligation. It is 
suggested that a better way to deal with those difficulties is to find that the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence is a substantive obligation such that retention 
of performance is possible but to find that retention cannot not be used where it 
would be inequitable in the circumstances of the case. This accords with the 
approach of the Scottish courts to employment and other personal contracts when 
specific implement is sought. 98 
Having set out the reasons for advocating development of the equitable control it is 
necessary to consider how this control should operate. 
 
(2) When and How Should the Equitable Control Operate? 
As mentioned in part B(3) there has been only limited discussion of when and how 
the equitable control should operate. It has been suggested that where retention is 
used simply as a means to delay having to perform an obligation the court should 
exercise its equitable control to refuse to allow retention.99 This would require an 
analysis of B’s claim of breach by A to determine whether there is a prima facie case 
for retention. Where there is no such case the court would be able to find that B is 
not entitled to retain her performance, it being inequitable to do so. B would also 
know that this would happen and would have to bear it in mind before seeking to 
invoke the right to retain. 
It has also been suggested that the court could use its discretion to order B to 
consign the sum sued for by A to court. 100 As noted above, where this occurs, B is no 
longer retaining performance but is not giving the benefit of her performance to A. 
This provides an element of security for both parties – that the sum is available to 
either of them depending on the outcome of the court action. However, this also has 
adverse consequences for both parties; during the time the sum is consigned neither  
can use it.  
Given the lack of discussion on the equitable control it may be instructive to consider 
control of a right similar to mutuality retention, that of special lien. 101   
 
 
 
                                                                     
98 While implement is a remedy available to the pursuer the court can exercise its equitable discretion 
to refuse the remedy, and does so, in employment contracts: see Macgregor, L. “Specific performance 
in Scots law” in J. Smits, D. Haas, and G. Hesen, Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and 
Other Perspectives, (2008) p 67.  
99 Gloag, Contract, (n55), p627.  
100 Inveresk 2010 SC (UKSC) 106 per Lord Hope at para 34; Earl of Galloway v M’Connell 1911 SC 846.  
101 See the discussion at p 10 above. 
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(a) Special Lien  
Gloag notes that lien, like retention, is subject to the equitable control of the 
court.102  The case law shows that where the amount due by the owner of the 
moveables (A) to the party having possession of them (B) is disputed, as to amount; 
or because it is alleged that the work done by B is inadequate; or a breach of 
contract by B has caused A loss, then provided the sum claimed by B is consigned by 
A, B must give up the corporeal moveables over which she is exercising a lien.103 
Where there is no dispute as to the amount due by A to B, B need not give up 
possession of A’s property on A consigning the sum claimed,104 it being noted that 
consignation of money is not a compulsitor to performance.105 The equitable control 
of lien by the courts is to prevent it from being used in an abusive fashion. This is 
what the equitable control of retention is also seeking to achieve. The next section 
considers the adequacy of the controls of special lien in the context of retention of 
contractual performance more generally.  
(b) Adequate Control of Retention 
It is suggested that provided B has a prima facie case of breach against A the courts 
should start from the position that B is entitled to retain performance of her 
counterpart contemporaneous obligations: the right to retain is available unless and 
until the court considers its exercise inequitable or its use oppressive. Concern has 
been expressed that the right to retain must be controlled so as not to undermine 
the need for contractual performance.106 Yet, it must be remembered that where 
there is a readily available right to retain it may improve contractual performance: 
acting as a compulsitor to performance; where A knows that if he breaches the 
contract B will be able to retain her performance A is more likely to perform his 
obligations.  
As noted above the equitable control of lien will operate by the court ordering 
consignation of the sum claimed by the party exercising the right of lien (B) where 
there is a dispute regarding the sum claimed or the work carried out. The owner of 
the property (A) must consign all of the sum claimed by B in order that the property 
be released. However, given there is a dispute about the sum claimed by B, it is not 
obvious that requiring A to consign the entire sum claimed by B produces justice as 
between the parties.  
                                                                    
102 Gloag, Contract, (n55), p 639. Specific implement is also subject to the equitable control of the 
court. In Grahame v Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R (HL) 91 Lord Watson stated at 91, “It appears 
to me that a Superior Court, having equitable jurisdiction, must also have a discretion, in certain 
exceptional cases, to withhold from parties applying for it that remedy which, in ordinary 
circumstances, they would be entitled as a matter of course. In order to justify the exercise of such a 
discretionary power there must be some very cogent reasons for depriving litigants of the ordinary 
means of enforcing their legal rights.”   
103 Parker v Brown & Co 1878 5 R 536; Garscadden v Ardrossan Dry Dock Co Ltd 1910 SC 178.  
104 Ferguson & Stuart v Grant 1856 18 D 536.  
105 Ibid per Lord Curriehill at 538.  
106 See for instance the comments in Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at para 14.  
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In addition, special lien is a more limited right than a right to retain contractual 
performance based on the mutuality principle. Special lien is exercised over 
corporeal moveables owned by A in B’s possession. Retention can relate to any 
obligation owed under a contract; an obligation to do or not do something, or to pay 
a sum of money. Furthermore, there is arguably a more obviously direct link 
between the obligations in relation to special lien. A provides B with his property in 
order that B does something with or to that property. Where A does not do what is 
required of him (paying the price for the work), B is able to retain A’s property until 
he does so.107 With retention there is an assumption that all of the obligations in a 
transaction are the counterparts of the other. There may therefore be less of an 
obviously direct link between the obligation breached by A and the performance 
which B is retaining. Hence it is suggested there is a need for a more rigorous 
equitable control of retention; essentially the need for a stronger control three given 
control one is permissive.  
 It is suggested that the court should exercise the control of retention in a more 
nuanced manner.  The court should consider the breach alleged to have been 
committed by A in terms of its value and impact on B; and the value of the 
obligations that B is withholding and the impact this has on A in determining 
whether, and to what extent, B should be able to retain her performance. Without 
taking account of these factors the flexibility of the equitable control is not utilised 
fully with the potential for inequitable results. This may be illustrated by some 
examples. 
Example 1: A sues B for £100,000. B claims that A is in breach of the contract in 
terms of which A is suing B. B claims losses as a result of the breach of £5,000. In 
those circumstances should B be able to retain performance of her entire obligation 
to pay the sum of £100,000? It is suggested that this should initially depend on 
whether B has a prima facie case in respect of both the breach and the loss claimed 
to flow from it; in other words the court is satisfied that a plea of retention has a 
foundation. A further factor is that B’s claim is, at best, £5,000. In such 
circumstances it seems unreasonable that she is able to retain all of the sum due to 
A. Yet it is also unreasonable to allow A all of the benefits of B’s performance when A 
is in breach of contract himself. It may therefore be more appropriate that B is able 
to retain part of her performance and partially perform her obligations to A. 
 
Example 2: A sues B for a sum of £5,000 and B claims that A is in breach of contract, 
resulting in loss to her of £10,000. Whether B should be able to retain would again 
depend on whether B has a prima facie case of breach by A and resulting loss. If the 
court is satisfied that B’s claim has a foundation it seems reasonable that B is able to 
retain all of her contractual performance given her damages claim exceeds A’s claim 
against her.  
                                                                     
107 Although the property retained can far exceed the value of the claim, for instance the retention of 
a ship in respect of a bill for repairs to the ship in Garscadden v Ardrossan Dry Dock Co Ltd 1910 SC 
178.  
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The discussion above, especially example 1,  highlights a major difficulty with 
retention; that, as it currently operates, B is able to withhold all of her obligations in 
the face of A’s breach. It is suggested that partial retention of performance should 
be available, as well as retention of all counterpart obligations.108 Whether whole or 
partial retention should be possible will depend on the value and impact of the 
obligation sought to be retained by B and that alleged to have been breached by A. 
While this is a departure from our current understanding of the law of retention it is 
not entirely unknown to Scots law.  
(c) Partial retention  
Where a tenant does not obtain possession of all of the subjects let he is able to 
abate the rent corresponding to the extent of possession not received.109 Here there 
is a clear link between the extent of the landlord’s breach and the tenant’s right to 
retain part of the rent.110 In discussing a tenant’s right to withhold rent, where he 
does have possession of the subjects but the landlord has failed in an obligation 
incumbent upon him in term of the lease, Hume states, 
to be quite fair and equitable, this sort of retention [retention based on 
mutuality of contract], must however be allowed under certain limitations 
only, which spring out of the situation of the contracting parties…..111 
He goes on to note that where the landlord is in breach of the lease the courts have 
generally been disposed to restrict the right of retention to the probable amount of 
the tenant’s claim in damages.112 In such a situation the tenant is able to use the 
leased premises but his ability to do so is impeded by the landlord’s failure to adhere 
to his obligations. The tenant is able to partially withhold rent reflecting the loss 
caused to him by the landlord’s breach. Rankine notes that while Hume’s views have 
not been expressly recognised by the courts they are “worthy of citation” on account 
of their “apparent reasonableness”.113  
Hume’s views were, in time, recognised by the court in cases in the mid-twentieth 
century. In Stobbs & Sons v Hislop114 Lord President Cooper noted obiter that in 
disputes between landlord and tenant the courts have made “innumerable                                                                     
108 McBryde suggests that when the right to retain exists it is a complete right: see McBryde, Contract 
(n4), para 2.68. However, he does not consider the equitable control of the right to retain, which as 
noted at p 10 above, was a feature in older cases and has only recently resurfaced. In Macari v Celtic 
Football and Athletic Co Ltd 1999 SC 628 the court stressed that the party with the right to retain 
must exercise it in full and cannot choose which of his obligations he will perform and which he will 
not. It is argued that the reason for such comments was due to the effect a finding of partial retention 
would have in the particular context of a contract of employment; such a finding would allow the 
employee to disregard the employer’s instructions regarding health and safety (at 643).  
109 Graham v Gordon (1843) 5 D 1207; and Munro v M’Geogh (1888) 16 R 93. 
110 Abatement can relate, but does not necessarily have to relate to, the landlord’s breach of the 
lease: see Rennie et al, Leases (2015), para 17.55.  
111 Bowie v Duncan, 1807, Hume, 839 at 839.  
112 Ibid.   
113 J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland, 3rd ed (1916), p 328.  
114 1948 SC 216.  
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refinements” to the right to retain including partial withholding of rent115 and that 
account has been taken of the materiality of the landlord’s breach and the probable 
damage sustained by the tenant before deciding whether, and if so, how much rent 
the tenant could retain.116 Furthermore, in an Inner House decision of seven 
judges117 the court noted that in pleading retention a defender tenant was inviting 
the court to exercise in his favour the discretionary equitable power, which the 
Court had long asserted in dealing with reciprocal obligations arising under mutual 
contracts, of permitting one party to withhold in whole or in part his obligations until 
the landlord had performed.118  
Outside of the realm of leases, the court has allowed an abatement of the price 
where machinery was installed that was disconform to contract.119 In relation to 
lump sum building contracts120 the court has found the builder entitled to payment 
where his breach was not material. However the price was reduced by the amount 
needed to make the property conform to contract.121 In these cases the employer 
was entitled to retain part of his performance given the contractor’s breach.  
It may also be noted that Art III-3:401(4) of the DCFR allows for whole or partial 
withholding of performance as may be reasonable in the circumstances. Parties may 
disagree about what is reasonable. For the reasons set out in the next section it is 
suggested that the court’s equitable control should operate in a more structured 
fashion that simply what is reasonable in the circumstances.    
(d) Shaping the Court’s Equitable Control 
In must be remembered that this control is based on the court exercising an 
equitable discretion. However, discretion does not inevitably mean uncertainty. 
Judicial discretion can, and is often, restricted by factors that the court should take 
into account.122 This has happened in the equitable discretion of the court to refuse 
                                                                    
115 Ibid at 223.  
116 Ibid at 226. Here Lord President Cooper specifically refers to the case in which Hume set out his 
views; in the report of Bowie v Duncan (n111).  
117 Brodie v Ker 1952 SC 216.  
118 Ibid at 226.  
119 Dick & Stevenson v Woodside Steel & Iron Co (1888) 16 R 424.  
120 In such contracts a sum is to be paid for the whole building being built; this is in contrast to a 
measure and value contract in terms of which particular sums are provided in the contract for each 
element of work to the building. 
121 Ramsay v Brand (1898) 25 R 1212; Speirs v Petersen 1924 SC 428. The former case was doubted in 
Forrest v Scottish County Investment Co 1915 SC 115, but was approved in Speirs. While this line of 
authority has been criticised (see the Scottish Law Commission 1999 Report on Remedies (n12), paras 
7.25-7.27) the defender’s counterclaim need not be damages based on a reinstatement value, which 
would often eclipse the sum sued for by the pursuer. Considering damages on a diminution of value 
basis would have allowed the court to come to an equitable solution between the parties in Steel v 
Young 1907 SC 360 instead of holding that the pursuer was not entitled to sue on the contract, 
leaving to him an action in enrichment against the defender.  
122 N Whitty, argues that even when faced with a wide discretion judges will apply informal rules of 
thumb to achieve sufficient certainty and predictability;  “From Rules to Discretion: Changes in the 
Fabric of Scots Private Law”, 2003 ELR 281, p 299-300.  
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specific implement, to the extent that there are categories of cases identified where 
specific implement will not be permitted.123 This section, drawing on the discussion 
above, sets out the factors that should be used to help shape the use of the 
equitable control of retention.  
The court should initially consider whether there is a prima facie basis for retention 
in order to be satisfied that it was not being pled simply to delay performance by the 
defender. Thereafter the court should consider the value of the breach of contract B 
claims has been committed by A, together with its effect on B, and consider this 
against the value of the performance B seeks to retain and its impact on A. While 
this article has highlighted that a major difficulty with the current law of retention is 
that there is no need for the performance retained to be proportionate to the 
breach, it is not suggested that the court should consider whether the performance 
retained by B is proportionate to A’s breach. This may be possible for the court but 
may be finely balanced and difficult to determine. Retention is available not simply 
as a defence, but also as a self-help remedy. Indeed, retention may be utilised most 
often as a self-help remedy. As such the equitable control of the remedy must be 
easily understood by parties and should not be difficult to apply. In addition, 
retention can act as a compulsitor to performance, and that would be diminished 
too greatly where the performance retained by B had to be proportionate to the 
obligation breached by A.  
It is therefore suggested that the test should be whether the performance retained 
by B is clearly disproportionate to A’s breach.124 Given retention is available as a 
right unless the court considers its use inequitable it is suggested that the onus of 
proof would be on A to take issue with B’s use of retention and to prove that the 
performance being retained by B was clearly disproportionate to his own breach of 
contract.125 Finally, the court could have regard to any policy considerations, for 
instance the effect of permitting retention in the context of certain types of 
contracts, such as employment contracts.126 This aspect would develop over time as 
different types of contracts are considered by the courts.  
                                                                    
123 McBryde, Contract (n4), para 23.15; L Macgregor, “Specific Performance” (n98), L Macgregor and H 
MacQueen, “Specific Implement, Interdict and Contractual Performance”, 1993. ELR 239.   
124 This is similar to the position adopted in Austrian law where the right to retain is limited by ABGB 
§1925(2) which prevents the abuse of a right to withhold; such abuse can be found in a flagrant 
disproportion in the interests of the parties: see the commentary to Art III-3:401 of the DCFR in the 
full edition (n37), p848.  The test proposed is not dissimilar to the test applied in determining whether 
a clause is a penalty. In Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 the Supreme Court 
held that for a clause to be held to be a penalty, and as such unenforceable, it would have to be 
shown that the detriment to the party in breach was out of all proportion to any legitimate interest in 
the innocent party in enforcing the primary obligation.  
125 This would accord with the position when specific implement is sought; it is for the defender to 
demonstrate to the court that it should not be granted.  
126 See the discussion at p 5-6, 12 and 16-17 above regarding the difficulties retention has caused in 
such contracts. The court will refuse to grant specific implement in contracts involving a personal 
relationship.  
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In developing the right to retain in this way the remedy will be more widely 
available; there being no need for the breach to be material. Yet the remedy can be 
kept within certain limits to ensure that it is not abused. The suggested changes also 
provide greater certainty than the current position given that it is unclear what level 
of materiality is needed before there is a right to retain and, even when that extent 
of materiality is determined, there may also be difficulties in identifying when the 
appropriate level has been reached on the particular facts of a case. At the same 
time, the suggestions advocated here provide some flexibility to the remedy; it no 
longer being a question of whether retention is available or not but whether, if 
retention is available, it should be complete retention or partial and the extent of 
any partial retention, taking into account the value and effect of the breach against 
the value and effect of the performance retained. By doing so this deals directly with 
one of the major concerns with the right to retain; that B can retain all of her 
performance which may be out of all proportion to A’s breach.  
 
D. Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated that there are currently difficulties with the right to 
retain contractual performance in Scots law. There are a number of controls, some 
of which have been more fully developed than others in the case law. Yet the cases 
have generally focussed on one of the controls and have not considered all of the 
controls and how they interact with each other. Such analysis is needed in order to 
determine how best to control retention. In addition, focussing on the extent and 
limits of a particular control has often clouded the problem with retention that the 
controls should be seeking to regulate; that the remedy, when available, can be 
extreme and result in inequitable results between the parties. In trying to avoid such 
a result in a particular case the courts have, it is suggested, sought to control 
retention in ways that are doctrinally unsound, such as limiting retention to 
substantive obligations only; or restricting its use to circumstances where it is 
available as security for future performance only. In seeking to come to the correct 
decision in any given case the law of retention has become distorted by the courts.  
Having considered the controls together, and focussing on the reasons why the right 
to retain needs to be controlled, it is argued that this is best done by developing the 
equitable control of the right, and in particular, recognising a right of partial 
retention. That this is the exercise of a discretion by the court does not mean that 
the control operates in an uncertain manner. Section C(2)(d) above sets out a 
framework for the exercise of that discretion, ultimately asking whether the 
performance retained by B is clearly disproportionate to A’s breach of contract. This 
framework can be utilised by judges tasked with making a decision but also, and 
importantly, can be understood and used by contracting parties and their advisers in 
determining whether and to what extent a right to retain is available.  
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The suggestions made in this article would allow the right to retain to be clarified 
and controlled in a more conceptually coherent fashion. Furthermore, controlling 
retention as suggested brings Scots law into closer alignment with other civilian 
systems where the right to retain is recognised, rather than seeking to use the 
English law concept of requiring a serious or material breach, which, as noted above 
is a standard more suited to rescission, not retention.  It is hoped that a suitable case 
comes before the courts in the near future in order to clarify some of the current 
issues with this remedy, which are causing problems for contracting parties and their 
advisers. More importantly, it is imperative that this important remedy is considered 
in a structured manner. Only then will there be a coherent understanding of the law 
of retention of contractual performance.   
 
 
 
